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January 1773 found the town of Boston mired deep in
political discontent. Since the passage of the Sugar and
Stamp Acts nearly a decade before, a cycle of metropolitan
discipline, colonial challenge, and increased (and increasingly incredulous) assertions of power from British authorities
had become wearyingly familiar to observers on both sides of
the ocean. The memory of the Boston Massacre of March 5,
1770, lingered in the minds of townspeople, as did the bitter
recollection of the Townshend Acts of 1767, which had
levied new taxes on imported goods, including paper, tea,
glass, paint, and lead. The acts had been repealed in 1770,
save for the duty on tea, an ominous reminder of the
transoceanic scope of Parliament's power to tax. More recently,
the Gaspde affair of June 1772-in which Rhode Islanders
had lured aground a British revenue cutter sent to enforce
imperial customs regulations, captured the crew, and burned
the ship-remained a catchword in mounting political
rhetoric thanks to British officials' announcement that the
perpetrators, if found, would be tried in England.
Fueling colonists' indignation at what they regarded as
the ever-increasing reach of the regulatory arms of
Westminster and Whitehall, imperial administrators had
issued a pair of decrees in 1772 that altered decades-old
practices by ordering that the salaries of colonial governors,
judges, and other law officials would thenceforth be paid
directly by the Crown rather than by the colonies. Fearing
that such a change in the source of colonial officials' salaries
would lead to a similar shift in those officials' loyalties,
colonists-led by their local assemblies-had begun to
consider resistance. In addition to preparing petitions to the
king that enumerated their grievances and requested relief,
Massachusetts colonial leaders in November 1772 organized
a committee of correspondence to allow for communication
among the colonys towns and with other colonies. A few
months later, the Virginia House of Burgesses would follow
suit, launching an intercolonial resistance network.
Against this background of increased tension between
metropole and colonies, January 1773 might strike observers,
then and now, as hardly the most propitious moment for an
imperial official to initiate a public debate regarding the
constitutional basis of the British Empire. Yet a desire for
such a debate simmered near the surface of everyday life in
the Massachusetts capital. Ever since the Stamp Act crisis of
1765, the question of the extent of Parliament's power to
regulate the colonies-most notably, in the form of taxeshad formed the subtext of everyday political discussion along
the Eastern Seaboard. To be sure, the Boston newspapers that
January featured the usual advertisements for imported wares
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such as chocolate, "choice West India RUM," Irish linens,
"new Raisins & Currants," and "Teneriffe and Madeira
WINES." By the end of the first week of the year, however, a
new political debate had begun a slow burn in the upper
chambers of the Province House. Soon reports of this great
controversy began to fill the columns alongside the
merchants' solicitations. Within three months, this debate
would whip Bostonians and their fellows in the rest of
Massachusetts into a frenzy, pulling the entire colonial
government into a vitriolic debate on the constitutional
underpinnings of the empire. The conflict would help to end
the career of Governor Thomas Hutchinson, finishing the
work of destruction that the Stamp Act mobs had begun
eight years earlier. And, most important for the story of
federalism, the political conflict of early 1773 would
highlight the growing divergence between the colonists' and
their imperial cousins' conceptions of sovereignty.
The debate between Hutchinson and the Massachusetts
colonial assembly, or General Court, unfolded between
January 6 and March 6, 1773, in a series of widely publicized
speeches and responses between Hutchinson and the General
Court, the latter acting sometimes in its collective capacity
and sometimes in its component parts of upper (Council)
and lower (House of Representatives) houses. These three
months provide a glimpse into a moment of significant crisis
in prewar America. That crisis was both political, inasmuch
as it concerned contemporary arrangements of power and
regulation, and constitutional, inasmuch as it concerned the
structure of imperial governance itself.
At the heart of the controversy lay the question of
sovereignty: that is, the question, "What is the highest
authority to which an individual owes duties and from which
an individual can demand fulfillment of rights?" Both
Hutchinson and the General Court sought to identify the
"final and absolute political authority in the political
community" such that "no final and absolute authority exists
elsewhere."' As each side of the debate articulated its vision
of the scope of parliamentary power and the concomitant
scope of the colonial assemblies' power, allegiances hardened
and visions of sovereignty began to diverge.2 While
Hutchinson hewed to a unitary view of sovereignty possessed
exclusively by Parliament, the members of the General Court
struggled to construct a workable scheme by which sovereignty
could be apportioned between Westminster and the colonies.
When, by 1774, this scheme proved elusive, the colonists
applied their fledgling conception of divisible sovereignty to
their efforts to promote union among the colonies.
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The debate between Hutchinson and the General Court
brought together some of the most theoretically sophisticated
minds of the day in a public dispute over the nature of
government power, a dispute that would expose a widening
schism between the British imperial view of sovereignty and
the colonial view. Spokesmen for the British Empire took
their cues from developments in domestic political theory,
which by the late eighteenth century increasingly insisted
that sovereignty was both indivisible and possessed by
Parliament alone. The great debate of 1773 thus illustrates an
important break with the metropolitan conception of
authority and an early instance in which colonists began to
grope toward a conception of multilayered sovereignty in
reaction to the theory of unitary sovereignty that they saw
gaining ground among British officials. This multilayered
sovereignty, in turn, would provide a crucial theoretical
underpinning for the development of American federalism.
The Boston debates of 1773 should be understood as
continuing this long history of confrontation while also
signaling a new urgency in the tone of the debate-a shift from
a state of relatively regular, if unsettling, dissent and discussion
to a heightened atmosphere of strife in which first principles
of government and constitution seemed to contemporaries to
require redefinition and reexamination. John Phillip Reid, in
an essay on the debate, refers to the addresses that each of the
three sides delivered as "legal briefs" submitted on "the one
occasion when the constitutional controversy was joined." For
this reason, Reid notes, "these briefs may well be the most
important legal documents of the prerevolutionary era."
In their detail, their comprehensiveness, and-perhaps
most important-their origin as speeches delivered in the
context of an actual debate, the addresses offer valuable
insight into the developing schism between imperial and
colonial visions of the nature of British sovereignty. The
debates served, on one side, as a rehearsal of post-Glorious
Revolution British political theory and, on the other side, as
a debut for creole constitutional notions that pointed toward
a new understanding of the nature of authority within a
composite political entity. In this way, the standoff between
governor and assembly in Massachusetts helps to illuminate
the path of colonial constitutional thought from the oppositional
mode of the 1760s to the more daring and experimental
(and, quite possibly, opportunistic and illegal) assertions of
the possibility of divided sovereignty that would characterize
the period between 1774 and 1787.
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Having served as lieutenant governor of Massachusetts
Bay Colony since 1758, Thomas Hutchinson became acting
governor in August 1769 and governor in March 1771. In
keeping with the antagonistic relationship that he had developed
with the people of Boston throughout his service as chief
justice of the colony's Superior Court and then as lieutenant
governor, Hutchinson immediately became a lightning rod
for the increasingly voluble critics of the imperial administration.
As Bernard Bailyn, Hutchinson's leading biographer, puts it,
"He was embroiled in argument with the opposition from
almost the first day of his acting governorship." 6
By late December 1772, confrontation between the governor
and the assembly appeared imminent. When the Boston
town meeting, led by Samuel Adams, formed a committee of
correspondence to caucus with other towns on the issue of
the Crown's assumption of the salaries of royal officials,
Hutchinson attempted to stanch radical sentiment by
exercising his prerogative to "prorogue," or suspend, that
session of the General Court. Despite the General Court's
hiatus, however, dissent continued to brew. Faced with
continued intransigence, Hutchinson determined to shift
strategy from muting to engaging the assembly. In a
December 22 letter to William Legge, 2nd Earl of Dartmouth
and secretary of state for the colonies, Hutchinson wrote, "I
am sorry that I am obliged to acquaint your Lordship with
the extravagant principles on Government which are still
avowed not only by the Writers in News papers but by the
Inhabitants of Towns who assemble together." Having in an
earlier letter dismissed the town meeting's activities as "irregular,"
the governor now contemplated a frontal assault on what he
viewed as the rabble-rousing General Court. "I am brought
to a necessity of requiring the Assembly to be more explicit
in declaring how far they approve or disapprove of such
proceedings and what sense they have of their dependence
upon the Supreme Authority of the B[ritish] isles and
Dominions than they have ever yet been."7 Explicit declarations
such as these would require open, public debate.
Two weeks later, on January 6, 1773, the General Court
convened in a special emergency session called by the governor.
Opening the debate, Hutchinson presented a forceful case
for the supremacy of metropolitan rule. Adhering to
post-Glorious Revolution, Whig-influenced political theory,
he took as his premise the notion that the paramount authority
of the British government was vested in Parliament, by which
he meant the unified political entity of king, Lords, and
Commons-a political version of the Holy Trinity in which
three seemingly distinct entities operated as one.'
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Dismissing claims that the colonial assemblies possessed
any powers apart from those granted to them by Parliament,
Hutchinson embraced the view that was at that time becoming
orthodoxy among many British political theorists: sovereignty
must be undivided and indivisible within any given state.'
Hutchinson based this argument on a twofold vision of the
empire that saw the colonies as British satellites and
Parliament as the center of British imperial power. Power
could be delegated from the central government to agents
such as royal governors, but such delegations were only
temporary; power could not truly be shared. "In sovereignty
there are no gradations," Samuel Johnson would write in
1775, echoing Blackstone's Commentaries, published a
decade earlier. Instead, Johnson insisted that every society
must contain "some power or other, from which there is no
appeal, which admits no restrictions, which pervades the
whole mass of the community.""' Hutchinson's January 6
speech to both houses of the General Court expressed the
same conviction that civil society required a single, supreme,
unlimited, rule-making and -enforcing power.
Despite his lack of formal legal training, Hutchinson
began with a narrow reading of the provision of the colonial
charter that had established a provincial legislature. "The
General Court has, by Charter, full Power to make such Laws
as are not repugnant to the Laws of England," Hutchinson
stated. Finding no specific statement in the charter denominating
the colonial legislature the "sole Power" governing the
province, he argued that the General Court's lawmaking
power was supplemental to, not exclusive of, the legislative
authority of Parliament. "Surely then this is by Charter a
Reserve of Power and Authority to Parliament ... and,
consequently, is a Limitation of the Power given to the
General Court," he concluded."
This line of argument illustrates the zero-sum nature of
the debate for Hutchinson. In order to make his case for the
complete supremacy of Parliament, he believed that he had
to prove the total subordination of the General Court. Any
limit on the power of the colonial assembly-especially if
that limit stemmed from the province's founding charterwould, he hoped, dispose of all challenges to the broad sweep
of metropolitan power. Absent an express grant of sole power
or sovereignty to the colonial assembly, Hutchinson argued
that any claim of independent legislative power by colonial
legislators must fail.
Besides focusing on the charter, Hutchinson emphasized
the spatial aspect of the original colonists' migration to
Massachusetts Bay. In an intricate argument that members of
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the House of Representatives would later turn against him,
he appeared to contend that the baggage brought by the first
English colonists to the New World had not included the
entire bundle of English rights, but that it did incorporate
the full array of English duties. Of the impossibility of the
wholesale transfer of English rights to the colonies,
Hutchinson had this to say:
They who claim Exemption from Acts of
Parliament by Virtue of their Rights as
Englishmen, should consider that it is impossible the Rights of English Subjects should be
the same, in every Respect, in all Parts of the
Dominions. It is one of their Rights as
English Subjects to be governed by Laws
made by Persons in whose Election they have,
from Time to Time, a Voice - They remove
from the Kingdom where, perhaps, they were
in the full Exercise of this Right to the
Plantations where it cannot be exercised or
where the Exercise of it would be of no
Benefit to them.12
In other words, when the original seventeenth-century
colonists quit England for Massachusetts Bay, they relinquished
some of their rights as English subjects. In his apparent zeal
to win the whole argument with this first oratorical gambit,
however, Hutchinson may have overstretched. His next sentence
paired this denial of English rights to the colonists with a
reaffirmation of English power over the colonists.
Does it follow that the Government, by their
Removal from one Part of the Dominions to
another, loses it's Authority over that Part to
which they remove, and that they are freed
from the Subjection they were under before;
or do they expect that Government should
relinquish its Authority because they cannot
enjoy this particular Right? Will it not rather
be said that, by this their voluntary Removal,
they have relinquished for a Time at least,
one of the Rights of an English Subject which
they might if they pleased have continued to
enjoy and may again enjoy whensoever they
return to the Place where it can be exercised?"
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According to Hutchinson, then, while English rights
might not weather the transatlantic voyage, English authority
could be salted away and then produced, as good as new, on
colonial shores. The early colonists had left behind their
homeland and some quantum of the rights granted to them
by their government, but this relocation most certainly had
not removed them beyond the reach of the long arm of
English-now British-authority. Hutchinson's argument
thus mixed elements of Roman law's emphasis on personality
with medieval law's emphasis on territoriality.14 The colonists
were British persons living in a portion, albeit remote, of the
British dominions. This British personhood bound them to
follow British law. Yet the remoteness of their territorial location
somehow excused British authorities from granting them the
full array of British rights. And, as had not been the case
when they emigrated in 1630 (a prior condition that
Hutchinson's steadfastly Whig, Westminster-centric theory
refused to acknowledge), British authority now resided
in Parliament.
At this point, the published accounts of the January 6
session convey the sense that Hutchinson had reached the
climax of his polemic. The colonial assemblies existed at the
pleasure of metropolitan authorities, he argued. Imperial
officials, Hutchinson among them, had never envisioned the
colonial governments as anything more than "subordinate
Powers," corporations "formed within the Kingdom" with
the limited brief of "mak[ing] and execut[ing] such Bylaws as
are for their immediate Use and Benefit."' The governor
then summed up his vision of sovereignty in a statement that
would ring in his own ears and the ears of his fellow colonists
for years to come. "I know of no Line that can be drawn
between the supreme Authority of Parliament and the total
Independence of the Colonies," Hutchinson declared. "It is
impossible there should be two independent Legislatures in
one and the same State, for although there may be but one
Head, the King, yet the two Legislative Bodies will make two
Governments as distinct as the Kingdoms of England and
Scotland before the Union."'
The governor thus made his case clear: despite their
recent pretensions to power, the colonial assemblies were
nothing more than the creatures of the supreme assembly
housed along the Thames. Hutchinson, like Dr. Johnson, viewed
sovereignty as containing no gradations; the power pervading
the whole mass of the British Atlantic community emanated
from the center and tolerated no provincial competition. No
line could be drawn between imperial and colonial power
because, simply put, colonial power had no independent
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existence. No line could be drawn because, according to
eighteenth-century British political theory, parliamentary
power had to be absolute and plenary in order to fulfill its
ancient constitutional mandate. No line could be drawn
because to delineate sovereignty was to deny sovereignty.

With his pronouncement in the Council Chamber,
Hutchinson declared his allegiance to a vision of sovereignty
that had emerged over the course of two centuries of English
political conflict. Sovereignty was, by the eighteenth century,
a highly contested and fraught concept. The issue of
sovereignty-its nature and its location-had lain at the
heart of much of the constitutional struggle that had gripped
England since the sixteenth century. The early modern
definition of English sovereignty typically hearkened back to
the Act in Restraint of Appeals of 1533, according to which
England was denominated an "empire," meaning-in the
words ofJ. G. A. Pocock-a political entity "exercising a final
and unappealable jurisdiction over itself in both church and
state."" A state that possessed "sovereignty," then, was a state
complete in itself, over which no other state (ecclesiastical or
political) could claim authority.
With the establishment of a notion of sovereignty as a
species of final dominion over the state that precluded
interference from any putatively higher power, the next
inquiry was where in the structure of government that
dominion ought to be lodged. Conflict over this issue underlay
the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution, two
watershed constitutional moments that continued to exert
tremendous influence on the minds of eighteenth-century
Britons, both at home and in the colonies. In 1642,
Parliament's declaration of a theory of its own sovereignty
helped to spark war but nevertheless laid the foundation for
the theory of parliamentary sovereignty that would gain
currency while continuing to cause strife over the subsequent
decades." By the latter half of the eighteenth century, some
commentators viewed parliamentary sovereignty as an
accepted part of British constitutional theory. Citing
Sir Edward Coke, Blackstone observed, "The power and
jurisdiction of parliament ... is so transcendent and absolute,
that it cannot be confined, either for causes or
persons, within any bounds."20
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
published between 1765 and 1769, aimed to enshrine the
unitary vision of sovereignty in late-eighteenth-century
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British legal thought.2 Blackstone inveighed against the concept
of imperium in imperio, by which he meant multiple sources
of authority sharing the same political space. At the time of
the Hutchinson-General Court debate, political theorists
routinely denounced the notion of imperium in imperio,
variously translated as "an empire within an empire" or
"dominion within dominion," as a "solecism."2 The specter
of imperium in imperio principle appealed to the early
modern desire for clear rules according to which governments
ought to be constructed. It provided an analytical framework
by which to assess the success (or, more often, the failure) of
any given political arrangement.
Yet this orthodox principle of sovereignty had only
recently become established, having begun as the centerpiece
of anti-Stuart, Parliamentarian ideology during the Civil War
of the 164 0s and cementing its place as the fundament of
Whig-and therefore English-constitutionalism in the
Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689.23 By the nineteenth century,
British theorists of government viewed parliamentary sovereignty
as integral to the nation's political and constitutional
structure. In 1773, however, the unitary vision of sovereignty
still required assertion and argument by such luminaries as
Blackstone to establish its hegemony after the turmoil and
uncertainty of the past century and a half.
But there was another way of looking at sovereignty-a
Continental view that acknowledged certain systems of
divided authority as legitimate, or at least plausible,
governmental structures. Beginning with the work of Hugo
Grotius in the early seventeenth century, and continuing with
the writing of Samuel von Pufendorf in the later seventeenth
century and Emer de Vattel in the middle of the eighteenth
century, European thinkers had offered an alternative to this
all-or-nothing, unitary vision of sovereignty.2 Using the
natural-law concept of federa-that is, treaties or positive
agreements among political entities-these theorists presented
an alternative to the English (later British) belief that multiple
sovereignties always spelled solecism and disaster. Instead,
they argued that leagues, compacts, and confederations could be
viable modes of political cooperation among sovereign bodies.
Throughout both Europe and America, this Continental
notion of divisible sovereignty had been bumping up against
the common law vision of unitary sovereignty throughout
the middle decades of the eighteenth century. Despite
the insistence of Blackstone, Johnson, and others that a
single sovereign power must be acknowledged to "pervade
the whole mass of the community," and-perhaps more
important-their insistence that this was not an argumentative
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but a descriptive claim about the essence of the common law,
the truth was that the nature of sovereignty was a contested,
not a settled, issue in Anglo-American constitutional thought
during this period.
Even before Hutchinson invited the General Court to
parley, some colonists in Massachusetts and beyond had the
tools to assess Parliament's claims of unlimited authority in
light of these alternative theories of sovereignty. For example,
Vattel's Droit des gens (Law of Nations) of 1758 was translated
and published in an English edition in 1759. This version
was followed in 1775 by an edition that was published in
Amsterdam and distributed by Benjamin Franklin to the
Library Company of Philadelphia, Harvard College, and the
Library of Congress.26 Richard Bland, writing in 1766,
included a citation to Vattel in his Inquiry Into the Rights of
the British Colonies.2 7 George Washington's library contained
a copy of Grotius's Rights of War and Peace in its English
translation of 1738.28
Indeed, the House of Representatives cited both Grotius
and Pufendorf during the course of the debate with
Hutchinson. The House answer of March 6 deployed both
theorists against the governor's assertion that the colonies
constituted part of the realm.2 9 "We beg Leave, upon what
your Excellency has observed of the Colony becoming Part of
the State, to subjoin the Opinions of several learned
Civilians," the House stated.
Colonies, says Puffendorf, are settled in
different Methods. For either the Colony
continues a Part of the Common Wealth it
was [sent] out from; or else is obliged to pay
a dutiful Regard to the Mother Common
Wealth, and so to be in Readiness to defend
and vindicate its Honor, and so is united by
a Sort of unequal Confederacy or lastly is
erected into a separate Common Wealth
and assumes the same Rights, with the State it
descended from.
Immediately following this passage (which the House
noted came from "a very able Lawyer in this Country"), the
answer cited Grotius for a similar proposition. "King Tullius,
as quoted by the same learned Author from Grotius, says,
'We look upon it to be neither Truth nor Justice that Mother
Cities ought of Necessity and by the Law of Nature to rule
over the Colonies."'o Hutchinson parried the reference with
his own interpretation. "Your Attempt to shew that new
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discovered Countries do not become Part of the State, from
the Authority of Puffendorff &c., will fail," he replied.
"[T~he Instance given by him of a Colony erected into a
separate Common Wealth plainly appears by the Context to
be by the Leave or Consent of the Parent State.
As this exchange demonstrates, European theory was
present in the Boston debates. The Grotian vision of the
law of nations emphasized what Edward Keene terms an
"extra-European order" of colonial and imperial systems

based on "the principle that sovereignty should be divided
across national and territorial boundaries." 'Pufendorf's Law
of Nature and Nations (1672) offered a similar vision of
nonunitary authority based on his study of the German
Empire. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the
empire had been reduced essentially to an elective monarchy.
Centralized sovereignty, if it had ever existed, had been
replaced by satellite princes, each husbanding his own store
of authority over his own territory. Notably, each of the
member states (Reichssranden) possessed the power to negotiate
its own foreign alliances. In the words of German historian
Hagen Schulze, "[F]ragmentation was the abiding constitutional
principle of the Holy Roman Empire, a structure without its
own statehood, organization or power.""
For Pufendorf, German fragmentation was an invitation
to revise the traditional Aristotelian categories of political
bodies (monarch, aristocracy, democracy) to take into
account the real-if unharmonious-structure of the
empire." Generalizing from the specifics of the empire and
certain classical leagues of states, Pufendorf developed a new
category: the "system of states" in which "several States are
joined to each other, each by a perpetual League or Alliance"
pursuant to which the states agree that "they shall not
exercise some Part of that Sovereignty there specified, without
the general Consent of each other." Sovereign powers that
did not implicate the common interest, however, were left to
each member state. "[T]hese Unions submit only some certain
Parts of the Sovereignty to mutual Direction," Pufendorf
noted, recommending that "the particular States reserve to
themselves all those Branches of the supreme Authority, the
Management of which can have little or no Influence (at least
directly) on the Affairs of the rest." In contrast to a unitary
theory of sovereignty, therefore, Pufendorf's conception
allowed for the possibility that political authority might cross
jurisdictional boundaries and, on occasion, be shared among
multiple states tied together in a single system.
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Hutchinson's speech fanned controversy among
Bostonians as they awaited the responses of the Council and
the House of Representatives. The town's newspapers were
quick to address the debate. Most newspapers printed
lengthy extracts of Hutchinson's speech, as well as letters and
other commentary that folded the speech into the ongoing
print discussion concerning the scope of parliamentary
authority. For example, in addition to carrying the latest
installment of John Adams's essays on the question of royal
officials' discretion to remove colonial judges, the BostonGazette and Country Journalof January 11, 1773, printed a
letter in which "An Elector" responded to the governor's
speech. After quoting Hutchinson's statement that he knew
of no line that could be drawn between the supreme authority
of Parliament and the total independence of the colonies, An
Elector requested clarification: "And, pray! what then? Which
is the Conclusion,therefore the Parliament have not the
intended Authority? or, therefore the Colonies are independent
of that Parliament?"36
While newspapers throughout the colonies debated the
consequences of Hutchinson's remarks, the members of the
Council and House of Representatives considered their
responses. Each house designated a committee to craft written
replies to be delivered to Hutchinson.3 Slightly more than
two weeks after Hutchinson's address to the General Court,
the two houses delivered their answers, the Council on
January 25 and the House on January 26. Each answer had
received unanimous approval in its respective house, as the
3
Boston-Gazette gleefully noted.
The Council's answer took up Hutchinson's theme of
lawmaking supremacy but resisted his conclusion by invoking
traditional imperatives of limited governmental authority.
Citing Magna Carta, the Council argued that Hutchinson's
phrase "supreme authority" actually translated into "unlimited
authority" and then charged that this was an untenable
proposition according to the ancient, fundamental law of
England, which held that no authority could legitimately
claim to be unlimited.3 1 "[If Supreme Authority includes
unlimited Authority, the Subjects of it are emphatically
Slaves," the Council argued. Moreover, the Council objected
to Hutchinson's use of the term supremacy, contending that
the word was a term of art with specific, nonterrestrial meaning.
"Supreme or unlimited Authority can with Fitness belong
only to the Sovereign of the Universe. ... But with Truth this can
be said of no other Authority whatever."" After thus chiding
Hutchinson for confusing mere political power with divine
dominion, the Council moved on to consider the limits that
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must necessarily attach to the former species of authority.
As these claims suggest, Anglo-Americans in the 1770s
did not consider the terms sovereignty and supremacy to be
necessarily synonymous." In general, the idea of sovereignty
in this period can be seen as an ill-defined concept relating to
the legitimate source of "right," as opposed to mere "power,"
within a given polity.42 Supremacy, in contrast, was a more
relative term that dealt with the question whether a particular
lawmaking body was the final authority within its jurisdiction.
Whatever difference existed between sovereignty and
supremacy did not matter greatly as long as the British nation
and the British Empire were viewed as coterminous. And
this was precisely the view of British officials. From the
standpoint of imperial administrators, because Parliament
was domestically sovereign, it was imperially supreme.
Sovereignty and supremacy therefore were synonymous for
imperial spokesmen, which allowed them to make the type of
sweeping claims that Hutchinson's speech asserted. The colonial
opposition, however, sought to break this equivalence
between rule over nation and rule over far-flung colonies,
especially in the wake of the Stamp Act crisis of 1765. Still
desirous of remaining British in the larger sense, they accepted
Parliament's authority over them, but only to the extent that
the authority did not trench on that of their local assemblies.
The willingness of the American whigs to contemplate a
system in which colonists lived under two layers of legislative
authority suggests that Adams and his peers had begun to
abandon the concept of supremacy, with its all-or-nothing
emphasis on a single dominant power. They were also beginning
to reject the Blackstonian concept of indivisible sovereignty,
insofar as they acknowledged only a limited authority of
Parliament to regulate trade but reserved the other legislative
powers for the colonial assemblies. Although Adams and his
fellow colonists might have agreed with Hutchinson that the
colonies were part of Britain (whether empire, realm, or
dominions was a separate issue), they disagreed with the governor's
assertion that no line could be drawn between submission
and independence. Parliament's authority over England,
Scotland, and Wales could and must, they argued, be distinguished
from its authority over America.
The House's answer to Hutchinson displayed this more
aggressive tone. The answer, which numbered twenty-six
pages when it was published in pamphlet form, met
Hutchinson's brief for parliamentary authority with a
point-by-point rebuttal of his theory of the empire. The House's
critique comprised several lines of argument, but two of the
most significant targets were Hutchinson's interpretation of the
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original Massachusetts charter and his larger theory of sovereignty.
The House began its investigation into the colony's early
history by disputing one of Hutchinson's key premises: his
claim that because the charter had not contained an express
grant of "sole power" to the colonial assembly, it had
therefore reserved the bulk of the legislative power to
Parliament, which in turn obligated the colonial assembly to
pass only such acts as were not repugnant to the laws of
England. In Hutchinson's view, therefore, the colonial assembly
was entirely the creature of Parliament. House members
challenged this hierarchy by offering their own construction
of the charter based on seventeenth-century political theory.
At the time of the English arrival in America, the House reply
contended, the prevailing theory held that the new colonial
lands belonged to the king's dominions, not to the kingdom.
They therefore possessed a special legal status that placed
them under Crown authority alone. "[T]he Right of disposing
of the Lands was in the Opinion of those Times vested solely in
the Crown," the House stated."
The chain of argument proceeded thus: if the colonies
were under the exclusive control of the Crown at the time of
the charter, then they were at that time not part of the realm;
if they were not part of the realm then, they could not now
be part of the kingdom of Great Britain; if they were not now
part of the kingdom of Great Britain, they were not now
under the control of Parliament. "If then the Colonies were
not annexed to the Realm, at the Time when their Charters
were granted, they never could be afterwards, without their
own special Consent, which has never since been had, or
even asked," the House stated. "Ifthey are not now annexed
to the Realm, they are not a Part of the Kingdom, and
consequently not subject to the Legislative Authority of the
Kingdom. " The House thus refused to take a historicizing
view of the original text, insisting instead that the constitution
of 1629 and the constitution of 1773 were one and the same.
This argument made historical sense: the Massachusetts
Bay Company had obtained its charter from Charles I in
1629, sixty years before the Glorious Revolution had
supplanted royal prerogative with parliamentary sovereignty
as the basis of English government. At the time of the
charter's drafting, therefore, English constitutional theory
placed the king at the top of the ladder of sovereignty.
Hutchinson's argument, in contrast, read the parliamentary
sovereignty of his own, post-1688 period backward based on
the assumption that the revolution settlement had applied
retroactively and for all time." Hutchinson's approach might
have been good Whig orthodoxy, but the House's answer
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charged that it was not good history.
By challenging Hutchinson's interpretation of the charter,
the House attacked imperial officials' equivalence between
parliamentary sovereignty at home and supremacy over the
colonial assemblies. Just as the Council had invoked Magna
Carta as a talisman of the ancient constitution against
overweening parliamentary power, the House sought refuge
in the traditional, pre-1 6 88 vision of Crown prerogative. The
Massachusetts colonial legislature therefore invoked what
John Phillip Reid terms the "authority of custom," which
openly challenged Parliament's authority both at home and
in the far reaches of the empire."
Was this argument in favor of Crown rule purely
instrumental? Perhaps; after all, England had fought a savage
civil war over the very issue of Crown prerogative versus
parliamentary sovereignty. Yet members of the colonial
opposition routinely pledged loyalty to the king during this
debate, adhering to what scholars have variously termed the
theory of dominion status or the "doctrine of allegiance" that
emphasized membership in a loosely defined association with
the monarch alone rather than membership in the British
nation."' As the eminent Scots-American jurist James Wilson
would put it in 1774, "[A]Ill the different members of the
British empire are distinct states, independent of each other,
but connected together under the same sovereign in right of
the same crown."" Adams made a similar distinction
between the kingdom of Britain and the dominion of the
king: "We are within the dominion, rule, or government of
the King of Great Britain," he acknowledged; however, he
added, "[W]e are not ... a part of the British kingdom,
realm, or state. "12 Although they chose different terms,
Wilson and Adams endorsed what Randolph Adams terms
the "commonwealth of nations" view of empire, which held
that the colonies were independent states, "that their sole
connection with Great Britain lay in the crown; that the
parliament at Westminster was but one of many co-equal
legislatures, analogous, for example, to the General Court of
Massachusetts Bay."" Rather than a choice for the Crown,
such arguments should be seen as a choice against Parliament:
the colonists sought to place their own legislatures directly
under royal authority by cutting Parliament out of the
hierarchy altogether.
The central role played by James Wilson, who emigrated
from Scotland to America in 1765 at the age of twenty-three, in
developing the doctrine of allegiance was not a coincidence.
For Wilson and other colonists who argued that the colonists
owed loyalty to the king alone, the example of Scotland
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provided a rich trove of legal arguments. The union of
crowns of 1603, in which James VI of Scotland also became
James I of England, "united the kingdoms only to the extent
that it gave them 'one Head or Sovereign'; it did not unite
them in one body politic."" By 1707, when the Act of Union
formally dissolved both the English and the Scottish
parliaments and brought England and Scotland into a new
entity called the British Parliament, English subjects and,
after 1607, American colonists-had lived through more
than a century's worth of debates about the practical
meaning of sovereignty and the many varieties of
Pufendorfian "systems of states" that could join two polities.56
The transformation from what David Armitage terms
the "composite monarchy' of England to the "multiple kingdom"
of Great Britain caused observers throughout Anglo-America
to consider seriously the possibility of multilevel political and
legal authorities besides the old feudal arrangements.
Moreover, because the era of the Anglo-Scottish unions
coincided with the era of English colonization in North
America, political thinkers on both sides of the ocean
frequently drew analogies between the status of Scotland and
that of the colonies. (Recall Hutchinson's January 6 statement
that he "knew of no line" that could be drawn between
parliamentary supremacy and colonial independence that
would not create "two Governments as distinct as the
Kingdoms of England and Scotland before the Union.") In
this way, as Armitage notes, the same ideology that accompanied
the melding of the multiple kingdom at home drove the
expansion of the empire overseas. Thus, "British state-building
and British empire-building" were "continuous with one
another in their origins as in their outcomes.""
This ideological connection between state- and empirebuilding informed many participants in the debate between
Hutchinson and the General Court. While Wilson's experience
as a Scot helped to shape his entire political outlook, Adams
explicitly used the Scottish case to bolster his arguments
against parliamentary authority." In particular, Adams focused
on the period following the union of crowns but before the
Act of Union, which he believed provided useful precedents
for the situation of the colonies in the 1760s and early 1770s.
Just as Scotland had shared a king but not a legislature with
England between 1603 and 1707, Adams contended, the
American colonies should be seen as owing allegiance to
George III but not to Parliament. Just as Scotland had maintained
its sovereignty until it had formally merged with England in
1707, the colonies remained sovereign in 1774. In each case, one
state had contracted its own arrangement with a sovereign
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who just happened to be the sovereign of another state-a
fact that did not affect the relationship between the sovereign
and the first state, which existed independent of the sovereign's
relationship with any other state. "Distinct states may be
united under one king. ... Massachusetts is a realm, New
York is a realm, Pennsylvania another realm, to all intents and
purposes, as much as Ireland is, or England or Scotland ever
were," Adams wrote in his Novanglus letters. "The King of
Great Britain is the sovereign of all these realms."60 Should
Britain and the colonies mutually determine that a complete
union was desirable, the full formalities of annexationnotably, consent, in the form of legislative acts on each
side-would be required.'
Another key element of the House's response was its
depiction of Hutchinson's argument as relying on outmoded
and inconsistent theories of authority. In his January 6
address, Hutchinson had offered a twofold argument: first,
the colonists were British subjects for purposes of their
obligations to Parliament, but not British subjects for
purposes of the rights that they might demand from
Parliament; second, the colonists were not physically situated
within the realm for purposes of rights, but they were physically
within the realm for purposes of obligations. Although by
"their voluntary Removal, they have relinquished for a Time
at least, one of the Rights of an English Subject" (i.e., fewer
rights because of removal from the kingdom), it did not
follow "that the Government, by their Removal from one
Part of the Dominions to another, loses it's Authority over
that Part to which they remove" (i.e., the same obligations
despite removal from the kingdom), the governor had asserted.
The Speeches of His Excellency Governor Hutchinson, 9-10.
This formulation was premised on a blend of Roman and
medieval precedents, which decreed that either the nationality
or the domicile of a person, respectively, governed the choice
of law to be applied to that person. According to
Hutchinson's reasoning, then, neither principles of personality
nor territoriality could aid the colonists in their attempt to
escape parliamentary authority.
The House challenged both the premise and the conclusion
of Hutchinson's jurisdictional interpretation. Rejecting what
they viewed as the governor's grab-bag approach to determining
which law governed the colonies, the House members
reiterated one of their fundamental arguments: the colonies
had never been part of the realm; therefore, Parliament never
had had-and, absent colonial consent, never would have- plenary
authority over the colonies. Placing great weight on the claim
that the colonies had never been within the realm, the House
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argument thus relied on the territorial principle of law. By
crossing the ocean and establishing colonies in Americacolonies formed pursuant to royal authority alone-the
earliest settlers had removed themselves from the realm and,
therefore, removed themselves from the ambit of parliamentary
power. Parliament's authority was "constitutionally confined
within the Limits of the Realm and the Nation collectively,
of which alone it is the Representing and Legislative
Assembly," the House reasoned. "[I]f that Part of the King's
Dominions to which they removed was not then a Part of the
Realm, and was never annexed to it, the Parliament lost no
Authority over it, having never had such Authority; and the
Emigrants were consequently freed from the Subjection they
were under before their Removal." 62 In short, the House
argued, domicile mattered more than nationality for purposes
of authority.
For purposes of rights, the House offered a winding and
delicate argument that skated quite close to Hutchinson's
reasoning, albeit with the opposite outcome. Although the
burdens of English nationality had not accompanied the
early colonists on their voyage to the New World, some of
their English rights had made the trip, pursuant to a grant
from the king. Most significant of these rights was the right
of representation in Parliament. "They never did relinquish
the Right to be governed by Laws made by Persons in whose
Election they had a Voice," the House stated. "The King
stipulated with them ... that they should be as free as those
who were to abide within the Realm." According to the
House, then, the territorial principle controlled in determining
that the colonies were not included in the realm, but a
special, affirmative stipulation by the king-under whose
exclusive authority the colonies continued-allowed the
colonists to claim English rights."
In this way, the House argued, its vision of colonial
duties and rights was, both logically and practically, more
coherent than Hutchinson's vision. "We cannot help observing,
that your Excellency's Manner of Reasoning on this Point,
seems to us to render the most valuable Clauses in our
Charter unintelligible," the response noted. "As if Persons
going from the Realm of England to inhabit in America,
should hold and exercise there a certain Right of English
Subjects; but in Order to exercise it in such Manner as to be
of any Benefit to them, they must not inhabit there, but
return to the Place where alone it can be exercised."'
As this statement highlights, Hutchinson's allowance of
English duties but not English rights to the colonists was
incompatible with his insistence that the colonists continued
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within the realm despite their relocation to America.
Parliamentary sovereignty purported to envelop both Britain
and the colonies in the same mantle of English law based on
the continuity of the realm, in both its political and its legal
capacities, across the ocean. Yet here we find the royal governor
of Massachusetts claiming, as the House response pointed
out, that a colonist who wished to enforce his rights-which
would presumably have become dormant during his stay in
the colonies-would first have to return to Britain in order
to reclaim them. Such a state of affairs did not speak well for
the universal aspirations of the British Empire, at least as
those aspirations were articulated in Hutchinson's assertion
that no line could be drawn between complete parliamentary
authority and complete colonial independence.
Indeed, the House draftsmen offered an alternative
version of the line-drawing metaphor. Obviously struck by
Hutchinson's pronouncement, the House members adapted
it for their own purposes: "[I]ndeed it is difficult, if possible,
to draw a Line of Distinction between the universal
Authority of Parliament over the Colonies, and no Authority
at all," the response observed.66 The blandness of the statement
belied its radical divergence from Hutchinson's imperial
orthodoxy. Drawing lines remained difficult, but suddenly it
was possible. Rather than pointing to the vast political
boundary that encompassed Britain and its dependencies and
then concluding that the lines of law and constitution must
necessarily follow the lines of might and rule, the colonial
opposition attempted to separate political lines from
constitutional ones. Even John Adams agreed that the
colonies were part of the British nation. But Adams, Wilson,
and their contemporaries in the General Court did not view
this political authority as necessarily decisive of final, legal
authority. Instead of accepting Hutchinson's all-or-nothing,
totalizing vision of imperial structure, the colonists sought to
adapt what had originally been an ad hoc structure of royal
charter and local assembly into a newly conceived vision of
Britishness. In so doing, they were-albeit unknowinglylaying the groundwork for a novel understanding of divisible
sovereignty and, eventually, federalism.
Yet one must keep in mind that the 1773 debates were
significant because they marked the beginning of a transition,
not because they witnessed the completion of that transition.
Despite the slowly shifting meaning of the term sovereignty,
the members of the House feared-or at least pretended to
fear-the unnatural creature of the imperium in imperio
sufficiently to deploy it against Hutchinson in their reply of
January 26. To bolster their claim that the original charters
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had placed the colonies under the exclusive control of the
king, the members of the House committee reinterpreted the
imperium in imperio principle as precluding Parliament from
exerting its power over the colonies. "[T]o suppose a
Parliamentary Authority over the Colonies under such
Charters, would necessarily induce that Solecism in Politics,
Imperium in Imperio," the House answer contended.
Premising their argument upon the existence and authority
of the assemblies from the earliest moments of colonial
settlement, the House members demurred to Hutchinson's
claims, using his own argument to conclude "that the
Colonies were by their Charters made distinct States from
the Mother Country."7
Throughout the debate, then, both sides employed the
imperium in imperio argument. Hutchinson relied on it to
underpin his claim that the colonial assemblies did not
possess legislative sovereignty; the members of the General
Court, for their part, relied on it for their challenge to
parliamentary authority. Both sides espoused the underlying
principle that multiple sovereigns could not exist within the
same political entity. Yet while Hutchinson took this principle
to mean that the sovereignty of Parliament at home must
translate into its supremacy abroad, the members of the
General Court used it to build a novel argument for the
sovereignty of the colonial assemblies based on a reconfiguration
of the lines of authority between Britain and America. And,
the House added, if such line-drawing proved beyond the
capacities of the royal governor, Massachusetts-in concert
with the other colonies-was prepared to essay it.
Despite colonists' speculations that Hutchinson lacked
the support of colonial administrators, correspondence
between the governor and Lord Dartmouth demonstrates
that Hutchinson had at least initiated the debate with his
superiors' blessing. Shortly after receiving Hutchinson's
letters of December 30 and January 7, Dartmouth wrote a
reply, dated March 3, in which he temporized somewhat but
ultimately agreed with Hutchinson's plan to broach the
subject of parliamentary authority. Unrest among the towns
of Massachusetts had "made it necessary that you should call
upon the Council and House of Representatives to be explicit
with regard to their sentiments of those proceedings and of
the doctrines they adopt," Dartmouth wrote, adding that
reports of open opposition to metropolitan control "made it
incumbent upon you to speak out upon the occasion." After
a carefully phrased caveat ("But how far it was or was not
expedient to enter so fully in your speech into an exposition
of your own opinion in respect to the principles of the

z

DRANG

AND REDRANG THELINE:THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY

ORIGINSoF FEDERALIDEASOr SOVEREIGNTY

constitution of the colony I am not able to judge"),
Dartmouth ended his letter with a measured endorsement of
Hutchinson's plan: "whatever the effect of that speech may
be, it was certainly justified in the intention and I hope it will
have the consequence to remove those prejudices which the
artificers of faction" had attempted to foist upon the minds
of the colonial opposition."
Hutchinson, meanwhile, was planning his rejoinder to
the two houses' answers to his initial speech. With each party
having aired its position, the subsequent round of statements
predictably became more vitriolic, demonstrating not movement
toward concord but rather growing entrenchment. "I shall at
the close of the Session give both the Council & House a full
reply & shew them from undeniable Authority what was
their Constitution at the beginning and what it still continues
to be and what must be the fatal consequences of departing
from it," Hutchinson wrote to Dartmouth on February 1."
The determination of the House and, to a lesser extent, the
Council to challenge imperial orthodoxy by asserting that the
lines of sovereignty could be redrawn had raised the stakes of
the debate for all parties.
Hutchinson addressed the General Court twice more
before proroguing the legislative session on March 6;
between his two speeches, each house issued a response. The
issue of sovereignty dominated the remainder of the discussion.
In his February 16 speech to both houses, Hutchinson first
addressed the Council before directing the bulk of his
comments to the House. As his comments to the Council
suggest, his "drawing a line" phrasing had again returned to
haunt him. The Council's "[a]ttempts to draw a Line as
the Limits of the Supreme Authority in Government, by
distinguishing some natural Rights as more peculiarly exempt
from such Authority than the rest, rather tend to evince the
Impracticability of drawing such a Line," Hutchinson stated."o
The governor thus stuck to his original observation that the
sovereignty of Parliament was complete and indivisible.
Addressing the House, Hutchinson noted that Massachusetts
Bay Colony was "holden as feudatory of the Imperial Crown
of England."7 Thus, the colony was "subject to one supreme
legislative power"-Parliament-along with the rest of the
one entire dominion of the British Empire.7
Just over a week after Hutchinson's second speech, the
Council issued what would be its final salvo; the House
followed with its answer five days later. Previously, the House
had produced the fierier response. Here, however, the
Council struck directly at the heart of the issue: whether two
coordinate authorities, in this case Parliament and the
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colonial assemblies, could ever exist within the same polity.
The Council based its argument on Hutchinson's previous
statement, uttered as part of his initial address on January 6,
that "although from the Nature of Government there must
be one Supreme Authority over the whole, yet this
Constitution will admit of Subordinate Powers with
Legislative and Executive Authority, greater or less, according
to Local and other Circumstances." The Council heartily
endorsed this assertion. "This is very true," the Council
noted, adding that allowing for the existence of subordinate
as well as supreme powers implied that "the Supreme Power
has no rightful Authority to take away or diminish" the
authority of the subordinate power. The supreme power
lacked such authority to police the subordinate power
because, the Council argued, the subordinate power was
constituted independently of the supreme power. If the
subordinate power were not independently constituted, then
it would not need to be denominated a subordinate power;
instead, it would be a subset of the supreme power. But this
was not the case. Each power had its own grant of authority and
its own zone of responsibility. Therefore, the Council
observed, "[T]he two Powers are not incompatible, and do subsist
together, each restraining its Acts to their Constitutional
Objects." Ibid., 86-87. The constitutional objects of each power
were distinct, and they were defined by their subject matter.
In other words, the colonists might consider consenting
to Parliament's supremacy if that supremacy was accompanied
by an independent acknowledgment of the colonial assemblies'
subordinate authority. Such an arrangement would keep the
two levels of legislative authority separate by assigning to each a
specific array of responsibilities: Parliament would supervise,
regulate, and legislate for the entire British Empire, including
America; the colonial legislatures, meanwhile, would oversee
all matters that did not relate to the empire as a whole.
This arrangement tracked the distinction between internal
and external affairs that observers such as Richard Bland,
Daniel Dulany, Thomas Pownall, and others had articulated
since the Stamp Act debates had raised the issue of the scope
of parliament's authority over the colonies.7 In the context of
the 1773 debates, however, the Council's delineation
between superior and subordinate powers moved beyond the
specific issue of taxation and toward the theoretical problem
of imperium in imperio as well as the practical difficulty of
having two legislatures operating over the same territory.
Without necessarily intending it, the members of the
Council had taken a crucial step toward articulating a new
vision of sovereignty. This reconception permitted sovereignty
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to be divided-not simply along the territorial lines that
early modern thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean
Bodin had posited, but along substantive, subject-matterdefined lines. Parliament would regulate matters relating to
the empire as a whole, while the colonial assemblies would
have authority over all other matters. The Council's proposal,
then, rebutted Hutchinson's claim that no line could be
drawn between complete parliamentary sovereignty and
complete colonial independence. Instead, the Council
suggested that Parliament and the General Court might
operate along parallel, not overlapping, planes.
In a broader sense, the proposal laid the foundation for
American federalism's parallel arrangement of national and
state legislatures. Hutchinson's equivalence between political
and legal boundaries based on territory would begin to give
way to legal boundaries based on subject matter: in 1773,
imperial versus colonial matters; sixteen years later, national
versus state matters. Such an arrangement would satisfy
Blackstone's maxim that "there is and must be in all [governments]
a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in
which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty,
reside" by granting the aforementioned supreme authority to
a specific arm of government depending on the particular
substantive issues at stake. No imperium in imperio would
result-and there would be no need for recourse to the
type of unitary, monolithic sovereign enshrined in the British
constitution.
As these debates illustrate, a transformation in the
understanding of sovereignty itself preceded-or, at
minimum, accompanied-American discussions of a revesting
of sovereignty in the people. The essence of the General
Court's break with imperial constitutional theory was its
members' insistence that the ultimate source of political
authority could be divided, rather than that it could be shifted
wholesale to reside, still unitary, in a different location within
the political community.

To his credit as a servant of the empire, Hutchinson
resisted to the end the Council's reformulation of sovereignty.
On March 6, he delivered the final installment in the great
debate with the General Court. The Council's distinction
between supreme and subordinate powers was specious, he
insisted, citing the "Inconsistency" of "supposing a subordinate
Power without a Power superior to it." Adhering to the
Blackstonian idea of sovereignty, the governor refused even to
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consider the possibility that authority could be divided along
subject-matter, as opposed to territorial, lines. "[I]f you are
still of Opinion that two Jurisdictions, each of them having
a Share in the Supreme Power, are compatible in the same
State, it can be to no Purpose to Reason or Argue upon the
other Parts of your Message," Hutchinson asserted. "It is
essential to the Being of Government that a Power should
always exist which no other Power within such Government
can have Right to withstand or controul."7 And, as had been
the case since 1688, when the English nation "returned to a
just Sense of the Supremacy of Parliament," that uncontrollable,
supreme power resided at Westminster.76 Having made his
last stand, the governor, in the words of one pamphlet, "was
pleas'd to put an End to the Session."7
By the spring of 1773, Hutchinson seems to have
realized that the debate with the General Court had strayed
far beyond the bounds of whatever initial approval his plan
had received from imperial administrators. Significantly, his
correspondence with Lord Dartmouth became increasingly
strained. Since taking office as secretary of state for the
colonies in 1772, Dartmouth had followed a policy of
conciliation in his dealings with the colonies.7 Faced with a
royal governor whose zealous advocacy of the official government
position had clearly ignited the simmering colonial opposition,
Dartmouth appears to have reconsidered the limited
approval of Hutchinson's plan that his own March 3 letter
had conveyed. News of Whitehall's increasing disapproval, as
well as the firestorm of public commentary that the debate
had sparked, seems to have begun to affect Hutchinson at
around the time of his March 6 speech to the General Court.
A marked decline in the quality of his handwriting, in
addition to his self-exculpatory letters to correspondents
besides Dartmouth, suggests the governor's anxiety. Yet he
continued to alternate between ringing affirmations and
defensive justifications of his own conduct. On March 10, he
wrote to an unknown correspondent that the "contagion"
that had begun in the town meeting "seems to have been
stopped by my speech to the Assembly and the consequent
Proceedings there."7' By April 25, however, a letter to
Dartmouth contained the following apologia: "If I could,
consistent with my duty to the King, have avoided any
controversy with the Assembly upon Constitutional Points, it
would have been most agreable to me. ... It affords me relief
that the propriety of the measure appears to His Majesty and
that he is pleased to approve of it.""
Hutchinson's fears were well founded. By June of 1773,
his imperial superiors had moved to sacrifice him in the hope
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of stanching the flow of unrest in Massachusetts. In letters
dated April 10 and June 2, Dartmouth essentially ordered
Hutchinson to halt the debate before he caused more damage
to the delicate imperial arrangement. Before the first of these
letters arrived in Boston, Hutchinson had already drafted a
historiacalamitatum to Dartmouth in which he explainedagain-his reasons for initiating the debate and attempted to
portray a stoic resignation both to the constitutional debacle
and to the blame that had already begun to attach to him.
Hutchinson reiterated his conviction of the supremacy of
Parliament: "My Sentiments of the Relation between the
Kingdom & its Colonies have been the same ever since I have
been capable of conceptions of the nature of Government,"
he wrote. "From the remote situation of the Colonies I
always supposed a different and more extensive Legislative
Power to be necessary for a Colony than for a Corporation in
England, a Supreme controuling Power nevertheless remaining
in the Legislative Authority of the whole Dominion." He
reminded Dartmouth that he himself had opposed the
Stamp Act and had instead argued for parliamentary
"forbearance" from exercising its power. And then he offered
what was essentially his resignation, citing the need for a
governor "of greater abilities" to stand against the "Principles
of Independency" on the march in Massachusetts."
The arrival of Dartmouth's April 10 letter changed
Hutchinson's mind, however. He scrapped his tormented
apologia and instead sent a crisply worded response to his
superior. "It gives me pain that any step which I have taken,
with the most sincere intention to promote His Majesty's
Service, should be judged to have a contrary effect,"
Hutchinson wrote. "[A]s far as I shall know His Majestys
pleasure upon any point whatsoever I will, as I have hitherto
done[,] endeavour strictly to conform to it. "82 He did not
mention resignation to Dartmouth until June 26, when he
asked permission to visit England in order to seek an alternative
post." Nearly a year later, on June 1, 1774, Hutchinson
departed for England, leaving Massachusetts to the military
governorship of General Thomas Gage. That day,
Hutchinson's son-in-law Peter Oliver, Jr., who remained in
Boston, noted in his diary, "Nothing but mobs and riots all
this summer.""

On the same day that Hutchinson departed for
England, where he would spend the rest of his life, the first
of five parliamentary acts that dramatically asserted
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Parliament's authority to legislate for the colonies took
effect." Derided by colonists as the Intolerable Acts, these
laws (also known as the Coercive Acts) comprised the Boston
Port Bill, which shut down the transport of goods through
the city's harbor; the Massachusetts Government Act, which
replaced the colony's charter government with a military
regime under Gage; the Administration of Justice Act, which
permitted British officials charged with capital offenses to be
tried in England or another colony; a new version of the
1765 Quartering Act, which ordered the colonies to house
British troops in occupied American houses and taverns; and
the Quebec Act, which granted the land between the Ohio
and Mississippi rivers to Quebec rather than the colonies."
As John Phillip Reid puts it, the Coercive Acts represented
the first time that Americans "were confronted by the ultimate
constitutional issue of executed parliamentary sovereignty."1
To be sure, the passage of the Declaratory Act in 1766
had asserted Parliament's "full power and authority to make
laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the
colonies and people of America ... in all cases whatsoever,"
but Parliament's subsequent exercises of authority over the
colonies had been confined to taxation (e.g., the Townshend
Acts and the Tea Acts). The passage of the Coercive Acts
signaled that Parliament intended to enforce the full sweep of
its lawmaking authority over the colonies. Despite
Hutchinson's sad downfall and retreat, imperial policy
remained as the governor had described it: Parliament's
sovereignty in the colonies was just as complete and indivisible
as its sovereignty at home.
The competing ideologies articulated by the parties to
the Hutchinson-General Court debate demonstrate the collision
between the Blackstonian vision of sovereignty as indivisible
and unitary and the colonists' increasingly federal vision in
which divided authority was not a solecism but a foundational
principle." In order to escape the snares of the imperium in
imperio principle, American colonists in the 1760s and 1770s
reconceived that principle. "The key doctrine of federalism
could survive criticism only to the extent that it could somehow
be distinguished from the ancient belief that imperium in
imperio was an illogical and unresolvable solecism," Bernard
Bailyn states. "So [Americans] reexamined that old formula,
took it apart, and showed, not its falsity, but its irrelevance in
the American situation."" They did this by breaking away
from the early modern conception of sovereignty as lodged
exclusively in a single supreme authority. If governmental
authority could be divided among several parallel institutions,
it could therefore be tied to subject-specific objects. In this
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way, as Bailyn puts it, "The two governments would intersect
only where they exercised concurrentpowers, and concurrence is
not the repugnance that lay at the heart of the ancient precept.""
What scholars have not adequately recognized, however,
is the significance of the debates between Hutchinson and
the General Court in, first, establishing the respective sides of
the sovereignty argument and, second, in providing a forum for
colonial innovation. The post-1773 forays of a few individuals
into this novel conception of sovereignty speak in language
strikingly similar to that used by the General Court. Writing in
1774, John Dickinson adopted the metaphor of line-drawing
that Hutchinson had first employed and that both houses of
the General Court had then adapted for their own use.
The authority of parliament has within these
few years been a question much agitated, and
great difficulty, we understand, has occurred
in tracing the line between the rights of the
mother country and those of the colonies. ...
Whatever difficulty may occur in tracing the
line, yet we contend that by the laws of God
and by the laws of the constitution a line
there must be beyond which her authority
cannot extend. ... We assert, a line there

must be, and shall now proceed, with great
deference to the judgment of others, to trace
that line. ...

As in his widely circulated Letters of a Farmer in
Pennsylvania of 1768, Dickinson then proceeded to draw a
line between regulating trade and legislating for the colonies'
internal affairs. The former, he contended, was permissible;
the latter was not. Dickinson thus emphasized a subject-matter
distinction separating the areas that a legislature might
permissibly oversee and those that it might not.
James Iredell invoked a similar substantive vision of the
scope of lawmaking authority, arguing in 1774 that the
imperium in imperio principle was "not at all applicable to our
case, though it has been so vainly and confidently relied on,"
because the emerging system of federalism relied on "several
distinct and independent legislatures, each engaged within a
separate scale, and employed about different objects."9 For
both Dickinson and Iredell, then, the objects of the law
determined which authority could legitimately pursue it.
Hutchinson had refused to grant such a distinction,
arguing that Parliament's sovereignty at home translated into
full authority over the colonies because the colonies, like the
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British Isles, were part of the realm. In other words,
Hutchinson understood legislative authority as coterminous
with territorial boundaries, while Dickinson, Wilson, and the
members of the General Court permitted legislative authority
to be segmented according to the boundaries of subject
matter." Hutchinson might have scored a temporary victory
for the empire in 1773 (albeit at the immense personal cost
of his own career), but the substantive inquiry proposed by
the General Court and embraced by Dickinson lived to
fight-and win-another day. In 1787, Alexander Hamilton
would describe the powers of the proposed federal government
as similarly bounded by subject matter, not by territory:
"[T]he laws of the confederacy, as to the enumerated and
legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, will become
the SUPREME LAW of the land."" The enumerated,
legitimate objects of an authority's jurisdiction, not the
reach of its might over a given piece of territory, would
determine whether its laws or those of a concurrent authority
would apply.
The arguments of the Council and House of
Representatives in January 1773 signaled the beginning of a
formal turn away from the British imperial constitution as
that constitution had been defined by metropolitan theorists.
Rather than tying sovereignty to territory, the members of
the General Court and their successors tied sovereignty to its
particular substantive objects; rather than insisting on sovereignty
as monolithic and unitary, the colonial opposition viewed it
as divisible into parallel and non-overlapping repositories.
From the earliest disputes of the 17 60s concerning the scope
of Parliament's authority, colonists and some imperial officials
had attempted to draw lines limiting that authority; every
time, imperial administrators had refused to consider that
lines could be drawn, let alone the specific lines that the
colonists proposed.
The debates of early 1773 signified an important transition
in Anglo-Americans' thinking about sovereignty, a moment
of divergence between imperial and colonial theory, and an
illustration of a key conceptual breakthrough that helped to
bring about the development of federalism. Whether the
General Court or Hutchinson-or neither-had the better
constitutional arguments at the time is less relevant for the
story of the intellectual history of federalism than the following
two facts: first, each side was deeply committed to its particular
constitutional vision; second, one can clearly see here
elements of the political-theoretical moves that would enable
the General Court and their successors to develop a domestic
version of Pufendorf's system of states.
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Federalism required a belief that lines could be drawn
between sources of authority. Imperial officials, citing the
increasingly powerful theory of parliamentary supremacy,
argued that such delineations were impossible. The General
Court suggested, however, that not only could lines be drawn
around sovereign authorities; they could be drawn according
to novel, subject-matter-specific principles. Despite their
tendentious origins, arguments such as these would in
subsequent years provide the foundation for the American
federal experiment. The Constitutional Convention
delegates' enumeration of the powers of the national government,
and their accompanying reservation of powers to the states,
expanded on the Massachusetts General Court members'
assertion, fourteen years earlier, that sovereignty could be
apportioned among authorities-and preserved against
competing claims-according to the substantive ends toward
which that sovereignty was directed.
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